The Surprising Scope Of Denial Orders
The Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) recently issued an order denying export privileges to one Mohammad Hakim Hashemi, with a last known address in London, after his conviction – apparently in absentia – for conspiracy to deliver US-origin aircraft parts to Iran. Nothing extraordinary about that. In fact, it’s commonplace for denial orders to issue the wake of convictions for violations of export controls.
But the scope of such orders – particularly, what they bar persons and entities other than Hashemi from doing – may be surprising to some. So it’s worthwhile to note what this particular order bars Hashemi from doing and what it bars the rest of us from doing.
First, the order bars Hashemi himself from “participat[ing] in any way”, directly or indirectly, in “any transaction involving any [dual use] commodity, software or technology … exported or to be exported from the United States”. Second, however, the order makes it a crime for anyone else:
- to export or re-export any US-origin dual-use item to or on behalf of Hashemi;
- to facilitate Hashemi’s acquisition or attempted acquisition of any such item exported from the US, including financing thereof;
- to acquire from Hashemi (a) abroad any such item that has been exported from the US, or (b) domestically any such item with reason to know that the item is intended to be exported from the US;
- to service any such US-origin item controlled by Hashemi that has been or will be exported from the US; or
- to service any such item controlled by Hashemi, of whatever origin, if such servicing involves use of any dual-use item that has been or will be exported from the US.
The last of these bans is, of course, almost comical in its complexity; but it illustrates the global reach to which Commerce Department denial orders routinely extend.